

23 DEC 1987

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. NIO for General Purpose Forces		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

*Handwritten:*  
copy  
Hony -  
It is discuss  
R

*Signature:* B/HW

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals,  
clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
Senior Review Panel	Phone No.

~~SECRET~~

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Senior Review Panel

NIC 04838-87  
23 December 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Senior Review Panel Comments on Draft  
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM) on  
Soviet Forces and Capabilities in the  
Northwestern TMO, internally dated  
14 December 1987

1. The Panel considers the draft IIM on Soviet forces and capabilities in the Northwestern TMO a generally comprehensive and workmanlike analysis. It contains much information of value; usefully supplements the series of Community studies on Soviet general purpose forces; and should be a significant reference for strategic planning.

2. We think some editorial revisions would substantially improve the accessibility of its information for non-specialist consumers:

a) an introductory setting (perhaps in the Key Judgments). This should include in addition to the Northwest TMO map mentioned on page 8, a summary or a graphic of presently assigned Soviet forces and their ratios to other TMO deployments, and a clearer presentation of the TMO concept--which we take as more than a geographical region (see for example p. 23, para. 32, on its force correlation aspects).

b) a more complete Key Judgments summary of trends--recent and projected--in the impressive quantitative and qualitative improvement in Soviet ground, air, and naval forces allocated to this theatre.

OK  
no on ratios  
11-14 TH  
Hold to look at C

~~SECRET~~

S E C R E T

c) a brief, separate section dedicated to a summary of Soviet force trends, which would pull together in one place highlights of the analysis of changing personnel, weapons systems and the like (assigned and allocated by Supreme High Command), now scattered in the text. Its purpose would be to help the reader grasp more readily the recent dramatic improvements in Soviet military strength in this TMO. *OK*

d) initial-use definitions of the many acronyms in the text that may be unfamiliar to non-technical readers. *OK*

3. Projections. The draft's presentation of force projections will obviously engage the attention of U. S. force planners. We think two matters troublesome:

a. Basis. The text projects--at places in extraordinary detail--near-term estimates of Soviet forces in the Northwest TMO through 1990, mid-term through 1995, long-term through 2000, but does not indicate any basis, whether in evidence or speculation, for the projections. Do these findings rest on special intelligence? If not, some explanation of the methodology would add persuasiveness. *Classify as secret note.*

b. Uniform Presentation. Analysis of recent trends and projections of ground, air and naval forces and capabilities lack uniformity in coverage and presentation. For example: the text has a table that projects Soviet ground forces and weapons to the year 2000 but lacks data on recent trends (say, for 1975-1985). There are no tabular projections for Air Defense forces (although the text cites possible 1988 and 1990 developments). Another table compares the 1982 and 1986 Northern Fleet Order of Battle; mentions a 1990 time frame; but does not go beyond it. Readers would find helpful more comparability in these service trends/projections, especially in the relevant tables. *OK*

25X1

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

25X1

5. Supplementary Matters

a. Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NNWFZ). The favorable attention and present advocacy given a NNWFZ (or their version of it) by the Soviets and the Finns--and the likelihood that the project will become a more significant strain in Soviet policy-- perhaps deserve some brief analysis.

*Develop arguments against*


b. Fifth Columns. The IIM has a long time-frame. Does the Community judge that subversion/active measures/fifth columns will play, within its estimative period, any significant role in Soviet military planning for the Northwest TMO? Does any evidence suggest a son-of-Quisling scenario? What are the probabilities of clandestine pre-positioning of Spetsnaz forces outside Soviet territory and within this TMO? If we have no such indications, and believe them unlikely, it would be helpful to make this clear.



William Leonhart



John B. McPherson



James D. Theberge



Courtland D. Perkins

cc: Ating Chairman, NIC (Mr. Hutchinson)  
NIO for Strategic Programs

ODCI/SRP:thelma

Distribution:

Orig - DCI

- 1 - AC/NIC (Mr. Hutchinson)
- 1 - NIO for GPF
- 1 - NIO for Economics
- 1 - NIO/AL/AG (Kate Hall)
- 1 - PO/NIC
- 1 - Executive Registry
- 1 - SRP File
- 1 - SRP Chrono
- 1 - SRP (Amb. Leonhart)
- 1 - SRP (Gen. McPherson)

25X1